

Remuneration policy and remuneration practices for the Identified Group (*Colectivo Identificado*), according to articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Delegated Regulation No. 604/2014

- a) **Information on the decision-making process used for determining the remuneration policy, as well as the number of meetings held by the main body overseeing remuneration during the financial year, including, if applicable, information about the composition and mandate of the remuneration committee, the external consultant whose services have been used for the determination of the remuneration policy, and the role played by the involved parties**

Board of Directors

The Board of Directors is the management body responsible for setting the general principles of the Remuneration Policy, and reviews it regularly. It is also responsible for its oversight and for ensuring the correct application of the said principles at Unicaja Banco. Consequently, the Board of Directors is competent to approve the Policy and its amendments, with the support of the Remuneration and Risk Committees when applicable.

The Remuneration Policy Associated to Risk Management currently in force was approved by the Board of Directors at the meeting held on 29 December 2016, and it updates the policy approved on 25 May 2012.

KPMG (section People Services – Dept. Compensation and Pensions) has collaborated as an external advisor in the process of adapting the “Remuneration Policy Associated to Risk Management” to the Directive 2013/36/EU, to the Spanish Law 10/2014 and Royal Decree 84/2015 and to Circular 2/2016 of the Bank of Spain.

The Identified Group is composed, in general terms and in accordance with the applicable regulations, by the directors, senior managers, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions, and any other employee receiving overall remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior managers and risk takers, whose professional activities have an important influence on Unicaja’s risk profile at a group, parent and subsidiary level.

On the other hand, the Remuneration Policy Associated to Risk Management respects the contents of the “Policy for the Remuneration of Directors of Unicaja Banco, S.A.” which was approved by the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders held on 27 April 2018, for the period 2018-2020. Additionally, due to the end of the lifetime of the remuneration policy, a new Policy for the Remuneration of Directors of Unicaja Banco, S.A. for the period 2021-2023 was submitted to the General Meeting. This policy, along the same lines as the previous one, was approved on 31 March 2021 and its content, applicable from 2021, is detailed in the Report on the Remuneration of Directors, published on the Institution’s corporate website.

In the preparation of the new Remuneration Policy, the Institution’s internal services have received the advice and collaboration of the law firm Uría Menéndez.

The Remuneration Committee, according to Article 33 of Unicaja Banco’s Board of Directors Regulations, shall be composed of a minimum of three and a maximum of five Directors, all of them without executive functions in the Institution. The majority of them and, in any case, the Chairperson, will be independent Directors.

The members of the Remuneration Committee shall be appointed by the Board of Directors taking into account the knowledge, experience and skills required for the functions to be performed. In 2020, the Remuneration Committee held six meetings.

Without prejudice to other functions attributed by the law (essentially, Art. 529 *quindecies* of the Royal Decree Law 1/2020 approving the Law on Corporate Enterprises –*Ley de Sociedades de Capital*-, and Art. 39 of the Royal Decree 84/2015), the Bylaws or the Board of Directors' Regulations, the Remuneration Committee has the following duties:

- To arrange for the observance of the remuneration policy established by Unicaja Banco.
- To prepare decisions on remunerations, including those having an effect on the Institution's risk and risk management, which shall be adopted by the Board of Directors.
- To propose to the Board of Directors the remuneration policy for Directors and Senior Management, as well as the individual remuneration and other contractual conditions of the executive Directors and Senior Managers, and to arrange for their observance.
- To prepare a specific report accompanying the proposal of the Policy for the Remuneration of the Board of Directors.

As for the Risk Committee, and with exclusive reference to this section, its duties include the collaboration to establish rational remuneration policies and practices.

For that purpose, the Risk Committee shall assess, without prejudice to the duties of the Remuneration Committee, whether the planned incentive policy takes account of risk, capital, liquidity, probability and timing of profits.

During 2020, Unicaja Banco's Risk Committee held a total of 11 meetings.

Other bodies and units

In the organizational structure of the parent company Unicaja Banco, the different duties related to the remuneration policy are assigned to the following Directorates, without prejudice to the involvement of other Directorates, Departments or corporate functions in the process of preparation, application or review of the policy: Directorate of Secretariat of Governing and Management Bodies, Human Resources Directorate, Internal Audit Directorate, Corporate Directorate of Global Risk Control, and Compliance Directorate.

The general mission for each of those Directorates is:

- General Directorate of General and Technical Secretariat: to organize, convene and assist in all the activities of the Governing and Management Bodies, informing of the adopted resolutions and following up on them. To manage the provision of the documents needed for the meetings of the Governing and Management Bodies; to prepare the minutes of the meetings; to communicate and send the documents to the appropriate bodies and institutions in relation to the activity of the Governing and Management Bodies; as well as to coordinate the completion of the reports to be approved or considered.
- Human Resources Directorate: to propose and implement the Human Resources policy, developing systems and procedures that are adequate to Unicaja Banco's needs; to participate and give advice on the preparation and assessment of the Institution's Remuneration Policy, including the remuneration scheme, the remuneration levels and the incentive programme, so as

to attract and retain the staff that the Institution needs and also to ensure the Policy's adequacy to the Institution's risk profile.

- Internal Audit Directorate: to carry out an independent and objective review of the quality and efficiency of the Institution's internal control system and of the risk management framework; and to carry out, at least once a year, a central and independent internal review of the Remuneration Policy of Unicaja Banco, in order to verify compliance with the remuneration guidelines and procedures adopted by the Board of Directors.
- Corporate Directorate of Global Risk Control: it is responsible for the control of all the Institution's risks, within the context of the RAF in force at any given time; it contributes to define risk-adjusted performance measures; it assesses how the variable remuneration scheme affects the Institution's risk profile and culture; it validates and assesses the data of risk adjustment and it cooperates as needed with the Remuneration and Risk Committees.
- Compliance Directorate: to work to ensure compliance with the applicable internal and external regulations; to analyze how the Remuneration Policy affects the Institution's compliance with the laws, internal policies and risk culture; and to report all the compliance risks and non-compliance problems detected, for them to be considered, in its oversight role, by the Board of Directors.

b) Information on the link between remuneration and results

In accordance with that set forth in the Remuneration Policy Associated to Risk Management, and therefore, in other sections of this document, where the remuneration is linked to results, the right to receive it and its total amount shall be based, in any case, on objective indicators. The variable remuneration of the Identified Group shall be reduced in the moment of the performance assessment if a negative behavior of the Institution's results or capital ratios is detected, whether in comparison with previous years or with peers, or if negative behavior of other parameters is detected, such as the degree of achievement of the objectives set.

c) The most important characteristics of the remuneration system, including information on the criteria used for performance measurement and risk adjustment, deferral policy and vesting criteria

Global remuneration

The Policy and the remuneration practices contained therein shall govern the overall remuneration applicable to Unicaja Banco's Identified Group, including salaries and discretionary pension benefits which may be considered as equivalent to variable remuneration.

As general principles of the global remuneration policy, it is established that the remuneration shall promote and be compatible with a proper and efficient risk management, without incentives to take risk that exceed the level tolerated by the Institution, taking as a reference, as applicable, the RAF approved by the Board of Directors, as well as the corporate strategy and long-term objectives, values and interests of Grupo Unicaja, avoiding conflicts of interest.

To reinforce the implementation of the remuneration policy, the "Identified Group" will be required not to use personal hedging strategies or insurance related to remuneration and liability which may undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.

Variable remuneration

Where remuneration includes variable components, it shall maintain a balanced and efficient relationship between these and the fixed components, so that the fixed component constitutes a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration.

In particular, the variable component shall not exceed 100% of the fixed component of each individual's total remuneration.

Variable components shall observe the following requirements, always respecting the principle of proportionality:

1. The total variable remuneration shall not limit the Institution's ability to strengthen the soundness of its capital base.
2. The variable remuneration of the Identified Group shall be cancelled or reduced in the moment of the performance assessment, if a negative behavior of the Institution's result or capital ratios is noticed, whether in comparison with previous years or with peers, or if a negative behavior of other parameters is detected, such as the degree of achievement of the objectives set.
3. In any case, the reduction in the variable remuneration shall always take place if there is a requirement or recommendation by the competent authority to limit the dividend distribution policy.
4. Up to 100% of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to *malus* or *clawback* arrangements.
5. Guaranteed variable remuneration is not compatible with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle, so it shall not be part of prospective remuneration plans, and shall be exceptional. It will be applied only when hiring new staff and where the Institution has a sound and strong capital base and shall be limited to the first year of employment.
6. 40 to 60% of the variable remuneration to be paid by the Institution to the members of the Identified Group shall be deferred for a certain period, considering the economic cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question. This period will never be shorter than three years or longer than five years.

In particular, for the financial year 2020, the following scheme shall be applicable:

a) Executive Directors:

At least 40% of the variable remuneration accrued in each financial year shall be deferred for a period of three to five years, and shall be subject to *ex post* adjustments for performance and for the evolution of the Institution's risk, capital and liquidity in the corresponding period.

For the period 2021-2023, in accordance with the new remuneration policy, 60% of the variable remuneration accrued in each financial year by the executive Directors shall be deferred for a period of five years, and shall be subject to *ex post* adjustments for performance and for the evolution of the Company's risk, capital and liquidity in the corresponding period.

b) Other members of the Management Committee (*Comité de Dirección*)

40% of the variable remuneration accrued in each financial year shall be deferred for a period of three to four years, and shall be subject to *ex post* adjustments for performance and for the evolution of the Institution's risk, capital and liquidity in the corresponding period.

c) Other members of the Identified Group:

40% of the variable remuneration accrued in each financial year shall be deferred for a period of three years, and shall be subject to *ex post* adjustments for performance and for the evolution of the Institution's risk, capital and liquidity in the corresponding period.

7. At least 50% of the variable remuneration of all the members of the Identified Group, whether deferred or not, shall be paid in instruments linked to the evolution of Unicaja Banco's shares and, when possible, in other type of instruments determined by the supervisor and which reflect properly the Institution's credit rating. These payments in instruments shall have a retention for the appropriate period and shall be subject to the evolution of the Institution's own funds.

In such cases where remuneration is linked to performance, the right to receive it and its total amount shall be based on objective indicators.

The Bylaws provide that part of the remuneration of executive Directors may be variable, correlated to any indicator of the performance of the Director or the company. Additionally, under the framework of the Remuneration Policy, of the Company's General Scheme of Incentives (*Esquema General de Incentivos*), of the specific scheme for executive Directors and the contractual agreements therein, the Board of Directors shall set and assess each financial year, following the proposal made by the Remuneration Committee, the specific variable-targets and other conditions to determine the accrual, amount and payment of variable remuneration, which may vary from one executive Director to another.

Features of the Annual Variable Remuneration Schemes for the Identified Group

The Scheme of Incentives for the Identified Group shall be approved annually:

- Scheme of Incentives for Executive Directors.
- Scheme of Incentives for Key Function Holders.
- Scheme of Incentives for other members of the Identified Group.

The following general calculation scheme will be applied, and it will determine the amount of variable remuneration to be received, which will be the result of multiplying the Index of Compliance with Objectives (ICO, *Índice de Cumplimiento de Objetivos*) in the year by the modulators that are set annually, by the established base incentive; all of the above subject to compliance with the restrictions established both at a general and system level.

Applicable restrictions (a)

$$\text{Amount to be received} = \text{ICO (b)} \times \text{Applicable modulators (c)} \times \text{Base or reference incentive (d)}$$

(a) In addition to the above mentioned restrictions (fixed-variable remuneration ratio, *ex-ante* and *ex-post* adjustments, deferral, payment in instruments, etc.), key restrictions will be set for each financial year, and partial non-compliance will not be permitted for these. These key restrictions may be general or specific to each system. General restrictions include compliance with the general and specific principles determined in the regulations, and system restrictions will require, as general rule, the achievement of, at least, the budgeted recurring Profit Before Tax (BAI, *Beneficio Antes de Impuestos*), as well as not reaching the limit in any basic metric of the RAF synthetic indicator for

the financial year. The said synthetic indicator will be composed of certain selected RAF metrics, including preferentially:

- CET1 Fully-loaded ratio
- Leverage ratio
- Efficiency ratio
- NSFR
- Distance in rating to Peer Group (number of notches)
- CET1 Fully-loaded sensitivity to the impact of the credit spread in the FVOCI portfolio
- NPA ratio (excluding repos –ATAs-)
- Cost of credit impairment over total exposure
- NPL ratio (excluding repos –ATAs-)

(b) The Index of Compliance with Objectives (ICO, *Índice de Cumplimiento de Objetivos*) is a synthetic indicator that reflects the degree of achievement of the targets assigned to each employee or unit, calculated as the weighted average of the degree of compliance reached in each of the assigned variable-targets.

To be entitled to receive incentives, the minimum percentage of achievement to be reached at the end of the financial year will be established, as well as the maximum percentage that can be reached. In the latest approved systems, it was established that, in order to receive incentives, at the end of the year an ICO of at least 90% had to be reached, and the indicator for each variable was limited to 120%, with the ICO ranging from 0 to 120.

(c) The ICO modulators are indicators that increase or reduce the ICO according to the circumstances defined at Institution, Unit and/or individual level for each one of the systems. As Institution modulators, the following will be preferably used:

- Synthetic indicators of compliance with the Business Plan.
- Recurring BAI (excess over budget).
- RAF synthetic indicators.

And at an individual level, the performance assessment.

(d) The annual reference amount for the calculation to be paid as incentives will be determined according to the incentive system, with the possibility of determining both a general percentage of variable remuneration over fixed remuneration, or of an amount per position performed in the financial year. In both cases, the maximum limit of 100% of variable remuneration over fixed remuneration will be respected.

The pay out of incentives shall take place once the Annual Accounts are approved at the General Meeting, and after completion of the analysis of compliance with the targets, variables and performance assessment corresponding to each System, so that compliance with the corresponding general criteria –to which incentives are subject- can be determined.

The Institution shall determine, for each system, in accordance with the analysis of results in the paragraph above, the total gross amount to pay in the year in concept of incentives. It shall take into account, for those purposes, compliance with the prudential capital requirements and, if applicable, the need to calculate the MDA and the imposition of limits on the determination and pay of variable remuneration.

If the calculations made result in a total amount to be paid out higher than that set by the Institution, it shall proceed to the directly proportional reduction of the gross individual amounts to pay as incentives, so that the total amount paid out does not exceed the mentioned quantitative limit.

Once a certain amount of variable remuneration has been determined, the pay out of the amounts deferred to be paid in the coming years shall be conditional upon the non-occurrence of circumstances that may result in the application of *malus* arrangements.

Exclusively for Other members of the Identified Group, under the interpretation of the proportionality principle, the neutralization of the principles of deferral, retention and payment in instruments shall be allowed, provided that the amount to be received by each of the persons affected by this system does not exceed in any case the annual amount of 50,000 euros and does not correspond, at least, to 50% of the fixed remuneration.

For the Identified Group, the variable remuneration already paid out in cash or in shares may be recovered if within the three years following its payment there is any of the circumstances set in the Remuneration Policy and stated in the section 'Risk adjustment requirements applicable to variable remuneration' of this document.

Due to the health and economic crisis caused by the COVID-19, for the year 2020, on the basis of the above, it was agreed to deactivate the incentive schemes for the members of the Identified Group.

Discretionary pension benefits

Discretionary pension benefits are, in general, those discretionary payments made by a credit institution on an individual basis to its staff under a pension plan or other instrument granting retirement benefits and which can be considered as similar to variable remuneration. In no case will include benefits granted to an employee under the Institution's pension scheme covering all the staff.

In line with the Remuneration Policy Associated to Risk Management, the discretionary pension commitments shall be established under criteria which, in any case, are aligned with the Institution's interests, so that its payment and effectiveness period do not result in remunerations for this concept which are not in line with the economic situation of the Institution when they are to be paid.

The Institution shall ensure that malus and clawback arrangements are applied to discretionary pension benefits in the same way as to other variable remuneration elements.

For executive Directors, general managers and similar officers, a significant part of the contributions to pension commitments or savings insurances to cover analogous contingencies, which will not be lower than 15%, shall be in variable components and shall be treated as discretionary benefits.

Risk adjustment requirements applicable to variable remunerations

The following requirements are set forth in the Institution's Remuneration Policy Associated to Risk Management:

- 40 to 60% of the variable remuneration shall be deferred for a certain period, considering the economic cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question. This period will never be shorter than three years or longer than five years.
- At least 50 per cent of the variable remuneration, whether deferred or not deferred, will be paid in Unicaja Banco's shares and, when possible, in other type of instruments determined by the supervisor and which reflect properly the Institution's credit rating.

The variable remuneration, including the deferred part, will be paid out or consolidated only if it is sustainable according to Unicaja Banco's financial situation, and if it is justified on the basis of the results of the Institution, the business unit or person in question.

Without prejudice to the application of the general principles of contract, labour or company law, the total variable remuneration shall be cancelled or significantly reduced where subdued or negative financial performance of Unicaja Banco occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and the reduction in the payouts of amounts previously earned, if any, through *malus* or *clawback* arrangements.

In this regard, up to 100% of the total variable remuneration of the Identified Group shall be subject to *malus* and *clawback* arrangements when there is a poor financial performance either of the Institution as a whole or of any specific Division, Directorate or Unit, whose action is relevant, in the terms established in the corresponding variable remuneration scheme.

Among the factors to be considered for these purposes, at least the following shall be included:

- a. Substantial failures in the risk management made by the Institution or by a significant Division, Directorate or Unit.
- b. The increase in the capital needs of the Institution or of any of its Divisions, Directorates or Unites that were not foreseen at the time the exposures were generated.
- c. Regulatory sanctions or judicial sentences on acts that may be attributable to a Division, Directorate or Unit, or to its managers.
- d. Significant misconduct, whether individual or collective. Particular consideration shall be given to the negative effects arising from the inappropriate marketing of products and the responsibilities of the persons or bodies that made those decisions.

In particular, in relation to the deferred variable remuneration that has to be paid, and for the purpose of its potential reduction, the following circumstances shall be considered, provided that there is a wilful misconduct or seriously negligent action directly attributable to the member of the Identified Group:

- a. The Institution's underlying financial condition has worsened significantly.
- b. There is an increase in the capital needs of the Institution resulting from a decision adopted by the Division, Directorate or Unit where the member of the Identified Group works or has worked, which was not foreseen at the time the exposure arose.
- c. The financial performance of the Institution, Division, Directorate or Unit where the member of the Identified Group works or has worked has been significantly reduced.
- d. The Institution, Division, Directorate or Unit where the member of the Identified Group works or has worked has suffered a wrong or inadequate risk management.
- e. The Institution has been required to or has been obliged to re-state any of its financial statements corresponding to any of the financial years included in the accrual or deferral period, where the such re-statement is not the result of a change in the regulations, and the

variable remuneration amount to be paid resulting from the said re-statement is lower than that initially accrued.

- f. There is in force a requirement or recommendation from the competent authority addressed to the Institution to limit its dividend distribution policy.
- g. The occurrence of circumstances that determine the lawful dismissal for misconduct of a member of the Identified Group, in accordance with the applicable labour regulations or, in the case of a Director, the occurrence of circumstances that result in his/her cessation from the position of director due to breach of his/her duties, to the performance of any action or omission that result in damage to the Institution, or the occurrence of the conditions needed for the Institution to be able to exercise its corporate liability action against him.
- h. The Institution is aware that there is a non-compliance with the suitability requirement by the member of the Identified Group which is also a member of the “Subject Group”, as defined in the Policy for Suitability Assessment in force in Unicaja, occurring during the accrual period.
- i. The member of the Identified Group has incurred in misconduct or serious wrong that has caused a prejudice to the Division, Directorate or Unit where the member of the Identified Group works or has worked
- j. The member of the Identified Group has carried out or participated in irregular misconduct or fraudulent activities. For these purposes, it will be especially considered the negative impact from the irregular marketing of products and the responsibility of the persons or bodies that made the corresponding decision.
- k. Regulatory sanctions or judicial sentences are imposed on the Institution for facts that may be attributable to the member of the Identified Group, or to the Division, Directorate or Unit where the member of the Identified Group works or has worked.

The variable remuneration already paid in cash or in instruments shall be subject to recovery if any of the circumstances described above occur within three years following its payment, when they derive from a willful misconduct or seriously negligent misconduct directly attributable to the member of the Identified Group.

As it has been said above, for the year 2020, a resolution was made to deactivate the incentive schemes for the members of the Identified Group.

Other payments

The payments due to early termination of the contracts of the “identified group” shall be reasonable and proportionate, and shall take into account the effective period of the service rendered and the agreed future service that will not be rendered, always without causing a prejudice to the Institution’s solvency. As a general rule, the compensations applied will be those foreseen in the Workers’ Statutes (*Estatuto de los Trabajadores*) or in the special regulations applicable, as well as those agreed, if any, in the contracts entered into. During the year 2020, a member of the “identified group” left the Institution, and a compensation payment of 430 thousand euros was paid out. Other two members of the “identified group” took early retirement (one of them on 31/12/2020) and in neither case the compensation paid can be considered as early termination, either due to the way in which it was paid or its amount.

Remuneration of Directors for their role as such

The remuneration of Directors for their role as such shall consist of a fixed salary and attendance fees for attending the meetings of the Board of Directors and its Committees.

General remuneration of Executive Directors

Executive Directors shall be entitled, too, to receive remuneration composed of:

- A fixed component, adequate to the services and responsibilities undertaken.
- A variable component, correlated to indicators of performance of the Company.
- An assistance component, covering the appropriate welfare and insurance systems.
- Compensation in case of separation or any other way of termination of the legal relationship with the Company due to circumstances not attributable to the Director.

d) The ratios between fixed and variable remuneration set in accordance with article 94 (1) (g) of Directive 2013/36/EU

The variable component shall not exceed 100% of the fixed component of each individual's total remuneration. However, the Institution may approve a higher percentage provided that it does not exceed 200% of the fixed component, pursuant to the procedure established in Article 34, 1 (g) 2 of the Law 10/2014. So far, the General Meeting of Shareholders has not exercised this authority.

e) Information on the performance criteria on which the entitlement to shares, options or variable remuneration components is based

Where variable remuneration is linked to results, the entitlement to receive it and its total amount shall be based, in any case, on objective indicators. In case of significant incentives, a multi-year assessment combining the results of the member of the Identified Group (assessed according to financial and non-financial criteria of the affected business Unit, if applicable) and the Institution's global results will also be taken into consideration. The outstanding risks associated to those results will be considered too.

The variable remuneration, including the deferred part, will be paid out or consolidated only if it is sustainable according to Unicaja Banco's financial situation, and if it is justified on the basis of the results of the Institution, the business unit or person in question.

Without prejudice to the application of the general principles of contract, labour or company law, the total variable remuneration shall be cancelled or considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of Unicaja Banco occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and the reduction in the payouts of amounts previously earned, if any, through malus or clawback arrangements.

In this sense, up to 100% of the total variable remuneration of the Identified Group shall be subject to malus and clawback arrangements.

f) The main parameters and rationale for the possible variable remuneration plans and other non-cash benefits

Variable remuneration

Where remuneration includes variable components, it shall have a balanced and efficient ratio with the fixed components, so that the fixed component constitutes sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration.

The variable components shall observe the following requirements, always respecting the principle of proportionality:

1. The total variable remuneration shall not limit the Institution's ability to strengthen the soundness of its capital base.

2. The variable remuneration of the Identified Group shall be cancelled or reduced in the moment of the performance assessment, if a negative behaviour of the Institution's results or capital ratios is noticed, whether in comparison with previous years or with peers, or if a negative behavior of other parameters is detected, such as the degree of achievement of the objectives sets. In any case, the reduction in the variable remuneration shall always take place if there is a requirement or recommendation in force by the competent authority to limit the dividend distribution policy.
3. Up to 100% of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements.
4. Guaranteed variable remuneration is not compatible with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle, so it shall not be part of prospective remuneration plans, and shall be exceptional. It will be applied only when hiring new staff and where the Institution has a sound and strong capital base and shall be limited to the first year of employment.

g) Aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, broken down by business area

Amounts of total fixed remuneration received during the financial year 2020 by the members of the Identified Group of Grupo Unicaja Banco, in thousands of euros:

Non-executive Directors	833
Executive Directors	1,636
Investment Banking	178
Commercial Banking	2,473
Asset Management	634
Corporate Functions	3,187
Independent Control Functions	1,433
Others	503

h) Aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, broken down by senior managers and employees whose activities have a significant influence on the Institution's risk profile, indicating the following:

- i) the amounts of remuneration for the financial year, split into fixed and variable remuneration, and the number of beneficiaries,
- ii) the amounts and forms of variable remuneration, split into cash, shares, share-linked instruments and other types,
- iii) the amounts of outstanding deferred remuneration, split into vested and unvested portions,
- iv) the amounts of deferred remuneration awarded during the financial year, paid out and reduced through performance adjustments,
- v) new sign-on and severance payments made during the financial year, and the number of beneficiaries of such payments,
- vi) the amount of severance payments awarded during the financial year, number of beneficiaries and highest amount awarded to a single person.

Information of the Identified Group of Grupo Unicaja Banco, in thousands of euros:

	Board of Directors. Non-executive Directors	Board of Directors. Executive Directors	Investment Banking	Commercial Banking	Asset Management	Corporate Functions	Independent Control Functions	Other
1. Identified Group (employees or not)	10	2						
2. Number of FTE identified employees			1	17	6	22	11	7
Of which: senior managers			-	3	-	5	4	-
Of which: in control functions			-	-	-	-	7	-
3. Total fixed remuneration amount	833	1,636	178	2,473	634	3,187	1,433	503
Of which: in cash	833	1,636	178	2,473	634	3,187	1,433	503
Of which: in shares or share-linked instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Of which: in other instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. Total variable remuneration amount	-	-	-	13	-	430	-	-
Of which: in cash	-	-	-	13	-	430	-	-
Of which: in shares or share-linked instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Of which: in other instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5. Amount of total variable remuneration vested in the year and deferred	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Of which: in cash	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Of which: in shares or share-linked instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Of which: in other instruments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Additional information on the total amount of variable remuneration								
6. Total amount of deferred variable remuneration accrued in previous years, according to Article 450 (1) (h) (iii) of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7. Amount of the specific <i>ex post</i> performance adjustment applied during the financial year to remuneration accrued in previous years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8. Number of beneficiaries of guaranteed variable remuneration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9. Total amount of guaranteed variable remuneration in the year	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10. Number of beneficiaries of severance pay for early termination of contract	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
11. Total amount of compensation for early termination of contract paid during the year	-	-	-	-	-	430	-	-
12. Highest amount of compensation for early termination of contract awarded to a person, according to Article 450.1 (h) (v) of the Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013	-	-	-	-	-	430	-	-
13. Number of beneficiaries of contributions to discretionary pension benefits made during the financial year	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14. Total amount of contributions to discretionary pension benefits during the financial year	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other additional information								
15. Total amount of variable remuneration accrued in multi-year periods in programmes not updated annually	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	Board of Directors. Non-executive Directors	Board of Directors. Executive Directors	Investment Banking	Commercial Banking	Asset Management	Corporate Functions	Independent Control Functions	Other
16. Number of beneficiaries of discretionary pension benefits who have left the Institution (due to retirement or termination)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17. Total amount of discretionary pension benefits paid out or retained during the year to persons who have left the Institution (due to retirement or termination)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

i) The number of individuals being remunerated € 1 million or more per financial year, broken down into pay bands of € 500,000 for remuneration between € 1 million and € 5 million, and into pay bands of € 1 million for remunerations of € 5 million and above

In 2020 no employee was remunerated € 1 million or more.

Other information to be provided under letter k) of the Rule 60 of the Circular 2/2016 of the Bank of Spain:

i. Description of the staff categories whose professional activities have a significant influence on the Institution's risk profile, regardless of the type of employment relationship of the employees performing them

For the purposes of the Remuneration Policy Associated to Risk Management, as it was said before, the group is composed by the directors, senior managers, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions and any other employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior managers and risk takers, whose activities have a significant influence on Unicaja's risk profile at a group level, parent company and subsidiaries.

As at 31 December 2020, this group was composed by 76 members:

- 2 Unicaja Banco Executive Directors.
- 10 Unicaja Banco Non-executive Directors.
- 3 Independent Directors of Banco Europeo de Finanzas.
- 12 members of Unicaja Banco's Senior Management.
- 5 members of the Senior Management of Group Companies.
- Unicaja Banco's Heads of: Internal Validation, Treasury and Capital Markets, Investor Relations, Market Analysis and Strategy, Balance Sheet Management, Asset Management, Risk Analysis, Analysis of Companies and Institutions, Analysis of Individual Customers, Credit Risk Control and Follow-up, Credit Risk Models, Properties, Investees, Corporate Banking, Specialized Banking, Means of Payment, Consumer Credit and Point-of-Sale Financing, Syndicate Lending, Financial and Fiscal Information, Efficiency and Research, HR, Technology, Planning, Analytics and Data, Secretary to the CEO, Commercial Strategy,

Commercial Intelligence and Digital Banking, Transactions, Customer Service, Organization and Transformation and Innovation.

- Unicaja Banco's Regional Managers for: Málaga, Castilla La Mancha-Madrid, Eastern Andalusia, Western Andalusia, Leon and Salamanca.
- Unicaja Banco's Data Protection Officer.
- Unicaja Banco's Heads of the following areas: Capital, Key Processes, Cybersecurity, Risks, Back Office, Front Office, Middle Office and Data Governance and Quality

ii. The measures established to adjust remuneration in case of performance under that expected

The variable remuneration of the Identified Group shall be cancelled or reduced in the moment of the performance assessment, if a negative behavior of the Institution's result or capital ratios is noticed, whether in comparison with previous years or with peers, or if a negative behavior of other parameters is detected, such as the degree of achievement of the objectives set.

In any case, the reduction in the variable remuneration shall always take place if there is a requirement or recommendation in force by the competent authority to limit the dividend distribution policy.

Up to 100% of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to *malus* or *clawback* arrangements.

The variable remuneration which has already been paid out, in cash or instruments, will be subject to *clawback* if within the three years following the payout, wilful misconduct or severely negligent conduct occurs directly attributable to the member of the Identified Group.

iii. Description of the criteria used in determining remuneration to take account of current and future risks

As general principles of the Remuneration Policy Associated to Risk Management, to be assessed upon its effective implementation, it is established that the remuneration shall be compatible with an adequate and efficient risk management, without incentives to take risk which exceed the levels tolerated by the Institution, taking as a reference, as far as it is applicable, the RAF approved by the Board of Directors, as well as the corporate strategy and objectives, values and long-term interests of Unicaja Banco, avoiding conflicts of interest.

To reinforce the application of the Policy, the Identified Group will be requested not to use personal hedging strategies or insurance related to remuneration and liability which may undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.

iv. Aggregate quantitative information on remunerations paid out during the previous financial year to the members of the body in charge of overseeing remuneration, if it is different from the Board of Directors

The body in charge of overseeing remunerations according to the policy in force is the Board of Directors. That information is therefore provided in the document

“Remuneration earned by Directors”, also published on the Institution’s corporate website.

v. Aggregate quantitative information on remunerations, broken down by business area of the credit institution (investment banking or commercial banking)

Information provided in section g) above: *Aggregate quantitative information on remunerations, broken down by business area.*

vi. The terms under which the General Meeting of Shareholders or equivalent body has approved a variable remuneration exceeding 100% of the fixed remuneration

As it has been said, Unicaja Banco’s General Meeting of Shareholders has not adopted any resolution in this sense.